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1. Introduction
Modelling credit risk in a coherent yet applicable manner
is an important yet challenging problem. The difficulties
arise from the combination of a large, and co-dependent
set of risk parameters such as default rates, recovery rates,
or exposures, which are correlated and non-stationary
in time. An additional issue is that of credit contagion
(Davis and Lo 2001, Jarrow and Yu 2001, Frey and
Backhaus 2003, Rogge and Scho ¨ nbucher 2003, Egloff
et al. 2004, Neu and Ku ¨ hn 2004, Giesecke and Weber
2006, Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn 2006, Kraft and Steffensen
2006), which examines the role of counter-party risk in
credit risk modelling. If a firm is in economic distress, or
defaults, this will have implications for any firm which is
economically influenced by this given firm, for example a
service provider to it, purchaser of its goods or a bank
with a credit line to the firm. The direct correlations
between firms caused by credit contagion lead to further
complications in modelling the overall, either portfolio
or economy-wide, level of risk. Davis and Lo (2001)
considered a model in which defaults occur either directly,
or through infection by another defaulted firm, with
probabilities for direct default or infection taken uniform
throughout the system (or throughout sectors, assuming
independence across sectors). Defaults occurring due to
both endogenous or exogenous causes were not consid-
ered in their setup. Jarrow and Yu (2001) introduced a
framework of primary and secondary firms, the former
default depending on some background stochastic process
while the latter were affected by a stochastic process and
the performance of the primary firms. They argued that
this was a reasonable level of detail for their purposes and
it also simplifies matters as there are no feedback loops
in the system. Secondary firms depend only on primary *Corresponding author. Email: jon.hatchett@hymans.co.uk
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9firms whose performance is independent of the secondary
firms. Rogge and Scho ¨ nbucher (2003) use copula func-
tions to quantify correlations in default dynamics, and
in particular to determine the impacts a defaulting obligor
will have on the hazard rates of other obligors in a
portfolio—conditioned on a specification of the set of
countdown levels of surviving obligors and on the set of
defaults that have already occurred at the given time.
While the expression of the conditional impact param-
eters in terms of a covariance of macro-economic factors
is intriguingly simple at a formal level, the evaluation
can, as pointed out by Rogge and Scho ¨ nbucher (2003),
be cumbersome in practice once a sizeable number of
defaults has occurred. Also, actually solving the dynamics
of hazard rates using the impact parameters thus com-
puted is an entirely non-trivial affair. This is hardly
addressed by Rogge and Scho ¨ nbucher (2003) even for
moderately sized portfolios. Another approach for model-
ling credit contagion dynamics was provided by Giesecke
and Weber (2006) who used the well known voter
process (Liggett 1999), from the theory of interacting
particle systems, to model interactions between firms.
They assumed a regular structure for their firms (a regu-
lar infinite hyper-cubic lattice) and focussed on the
equilibrium properties of the model. The model is
highly idealized. It would seem that both the regularity
(and the symmetry) of the interaction pattern would have
to be abandoned, if one were to calibrate a model of this
kind to represent realistic patterns of mutual dependen-
cies. Egloff et al. (2004) model contagion using a linear
coupling of asset returns between business counterparts to
describe the micro-structure of mutual dependencies. This
leads to a self-consistent description of mutual dependen-
cies in equilibrium (though an autoregressive mechanism
is mentioned to capture non-equilibrium situations),
which allows analytic solutions even for the case of
asymmetric and heterogeneous impacts. This feature
would seem to open the way for a proper calibration of
their model, though it has been argued (Siu et al. 2005)
that feedback mechanisms via rating events rather than
(unobservable) asset returns would be preferable in
realistic models of contagion. Frey and Backhaus (2003)
and Kraft and Steffensen (2006) use continuous time
Markov models to describe the dynamics of transitions of
the indicator variables describing rating classes of the
obligors in a portfolio. The major problem here is that the
state space of the system grows exponentially in portfolio
size. Frey and Backhaus circumvent this problem by using
a mean-field approximation for large portfolios, assuming
that these portfolios contain only a small number of
different sectors, and that contagion effects are homo-
geneous within sectors, whereas Kraft and Steffensen
(2006) concentrate on small portfolios (involving two or
three firms), and so-called n-to default baskets with small
n chosen such that the dimension of the state space
remains small, allowing them, among other things, to
derive explicit results for loss distributions, and also to
address pricing issues in some detail. Longstaff and Rajan
(2007) use a model for the prices of synthetic CDOs to try
and understand the market implied expectations of
default risk and correlations. They show that a significant
fraction of the default spread for a typical firm in their
analysis is due to events where firms default concurrently,
although they do not discuss in detail any model for
causation, or in particular contagion. Errais et al. (2007)
model loss and default processes at portfolio level by
assuming defaults arrive at an intensity that is affected by
the recent history of losses, thus creating a self-excitation
effect of losses, the details of which depend on the
memory span of the loss history, i.e. on the default
process as well as on recovery rates. The approach models
positive feedback at an aggregate level, and is capable of
describing clustering of defaults; like Longstaff and Rajan
(2007) it leaves questions specifically concerning con-
tagion aside.
There are a variety of techniques for modelling the
correlations between firms’ default behaviour, which is a
major complication in credit risk modelling. The binomial
expansion technique assumes independence between firms
so that the number of defaults in a portfolio is described
by a binomial distribution. In order to capture the effects
of correlations a binomial distribution with an ‘effective’
number of firms is assumed which is smaller than the
actual number in the portfolio, but the weight given
to each firm is scaled so as to keep the mean number
of defaults constant, while the variance of the overall
number of defaults is increased. The relationship between
the true number of firms and the effective reduced
number is a modelling choice that depends on the diver-
sity of the firms in terms of sectors, geographic locations
or any other identifiable trait that would lead to
strong correlations in default behaviour. J. P. Morgans’
CreditMetrics approach (J. P. Morgan Global Research
1997) and Credit Suisse First Financial Products
CreditRisk
þ (Credit Suisse First Boston 1997) (see
Gordy (2000) for a detailed comparison between the
two) use the correlations in equity values as a surrogate
for the correlations in credit quality. The structural
modelling approach goes back a long way to work by
Merton (1974) which directly models the dynamics of
a firm’s assets, with default being triggered by the asset
value hitting some predetermined value (which hence-
forth we take without loss of generality to be zero).
Correlations between firms are due to correlations in the
dynamics of different firms’ assets. This approach is very
general, as it is relatively transparent to identify different
driving forces of asset levels and straightforward to
include them in the model (though the resulting model
itself will be non-trivial). However, it suffers from the fact
that the asset level is not an observable quantity (Siu et al.
2005). On the other hand, the reduced form approach
gives default rates for a given firm without modelling the
underlying default process. Correlations are then directly
introduced between the default rates. There was some
discussion in the literature about whether the reduced
form model could describe the true level of default
correlations seen empirically. Yu (2007) seems to have
answered this question in the affirmative if a suitable
structure between the default rates is taken into account,
while the results of Das et al. (2007) seem to imply that
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9the reduced form model is insufficient to fully account for
observed default correlations and direct contagion would
indeed be required for a full explanation.
The approach we take here is a discrete time Markov
process (at the microeconomic level) where the prob-
ability of a default of a given firm in a particular time step
depends materially on the state of its economic partners at
the start of that time step, as well as on macro-economic
influences. The model we look at was proposed by Neu
and Ku ¨ hn (2004), and initially studied using Monte-
Carlo simulations. The model improves upon Frey and
Backhaus (2003) by introducing a fully heterogeneous
specification, with model parameters given in terms of
unconditional and conditional default probabilities, or
alternatively as a variant of Egloff et al. (2004) in which a
full dynamic description is maintained, and contagion is
via rating events (defaults) rather than via unobservable
asset returns. Using techniques developed in the statistical
mechanics of disordered systems (Hatchett et al. 2004,
Nikoletopoulos et al. 2004, Pe ´ rez Castillo et al. 2004),
and recently applied to this specific model by Hatchett
and Ku ¨ hn (2006), we are able to solve the dynamics
of our model exactly, and given our assumptions that
we describe shortly, this solution takes a particularly
simple form despite the fact that in principle we have
feedback correlations, non-equilibrium dynamics and in
principle non-Markovian behaviour at the macroscopic
(economy/portfolio-wide) level. We note that it is possible
to frame our model in either the structural approach or
the reduced form approach, depending on requirements
and taste, although the interpretation of the variables
in the two approaches will of course be different. The
original structural approach due to Merton (1974) was
framed in continuous time and based on continuous
values of stock prices thus allowing the mathematics of
continuous time finance and option pricing to be brought
to bear on the problem. In contrast, the approach we
have taken is discrete time. This reflects our focus on the
contagion process and its effect on system-wide losses
rather than pricing any particular credit instrument. In
the end, however, we derive a one-dimensional in time
equation for an economy-wide variable and so the time
discretization used could be as fine as desired without
heavily impacting on the computational power required
to solve the resulting equations. All that would be
required was a rescaling of the relevant variables. We
find that the correlations introduced through credit con-
tagion lead to large increases in default rates in times of
economic stress, above and beyond those introduced by
simple macro-economic dependencies. This has strong
implications for portfolio risk management. We have
focussed our attention on understanding the contagion
process itself and how this affects the loss distribution
rather than calibrating the model to specific market
data so as to price credit products. However, despite
taking a bottom-up approach from microscopic equations
we are still able to derive an analytic loss distribution
which we feel is one of the major contributions of
this paper.
2. The microeconomic framework
We will analyse an economy of N firms in the large N
limit. Generally, we focus on the characteristic changes in
the economy due to interactions between firms, which will
be described in a probabilistic manner.
As mentioned in the Introduction we take a discrete
time approach. For clarity we restrict our discussion to
a one year time frame split into 12 steps; this is not
essential, but parameters may need rescaling depending
on the setup. We use a binary indicator variable ni,t to
denote whether firm i is solvent at time t (ni,t¼0) or has
defaulted (ni,t¼1). The default process is a function of an
underlying stochastic process for each firm in terms of a
‘wealth’ variable Wi,t, where we assume default if the
wealth drops below zero. We shall assume that recovery
from default over the time horizon of a year is not
possible, so that the defaulted state is absorbing. As a
function of the wealth, therefore, the indicator variables
evolve according to
ni,tþ1 ¼ ni,t þð 1   ni,tÞ ð Wi,tÞ, ð1Þ
where  (...) is the Heavyside function.
A dynamic model for the indicator variables is obtained
from (1) by specifying the underlying stochastic process
for the wealth variables Wi,t. We shall take it to be of the
form
Wi,t ¼ #i  
X N
j¼1
Jijnj,t    i,t: ð2Þ
Here, #i denotes an initial wealth of firm i at the beginning
of the risk horizon, and Jij quantifies the material impact
on the wealth of firm i that would be caused by a default
of firm j. This may or may not be a reduction in wealth,
depending on whether j has a cooperative (Jij40) or a
competitive (Jij50) economic relation with i.
We shall assume that the fluctuating contributions  i,t
to (2) are zero-mean Gaussians. There is still some degree
of flexibility concerning the decomposition of the  i,t
into contributions that are intrinsic to the firm and
extrinsic contributions. The latter describe the influence
of economy-wide fluctuations or fluctuations pertaining
to different economic sectors, depending on the level
of detail required. We restrict ourselves to a minimal
model containing a single macro-economic factor
(assumed to be constant over a risk horizon of a year),
and individual fluctuations for each firm,
 i,t ¼  ið
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 i
p
 0 þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    i
p
 i,tÞ, ð3Þ
where  i sets the scale of the individual fluctuations, and
the { i,t} are taken to be independent N(0,1) Gaussians;
finally, the parameters  i quantify the correlations of the
 i,t created via the coupling to economy-wide fluctuations
 0, also taken to be N(0,1). It is not necessary to take the
 i,t independent, but it allows us to interpret the wealth
of the firm as being given by #i 
P
j6¼i Jijnj which des-
cribes the state of the firm (which evolves as a jump
process each time step), and then the fluctuations about
Feature 375
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
K
i
n
g
s
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
1
:
3
7
 
1
0
 
J
u
n
e
 
2
0
0
9that state give a certain intensity of defaults per time step
(given the wealth).
Up to this point the wealth dynamics does not contain
an endogenous drift. If predictions are required over
longer time periods then it may also be pertinent to
introduce such a drift, e.g. by using a time-dependent #i,
#i,t¼#i(0) e
zit, where zi denotes an intrinsic growth rate
of the average wealth of firm i (with zi40 for a firm
making profits and zi50 for a firm making losses).
However, for the current purposes of examining default
rates over the medium term and especially focussing
on the behaviour on the tails, this adjustment does not
lead to significant changes in our overall conclusion.
The model, as formulated above, clearly takes a
structural point of view on the problem of credit con-
tagion. However, we note that the dynamics (1) of the
indicator variables is clearly independent of the scale of
the wealth variables Wi,t. By appropriately rescaling the
initial wealth #i and the impact parameters Jij we can thus
assume a unit-scale  i 1 for the noise variables (3).
Interestingly, this simple rescaling, which leaves the
dynamics of the system unaffected, amounts to changing
to a reduced-form interpretation of the dynamics.
To see this, note from (2) that the event Wi,t50i s
equivalent to  i,t 4#i  
PN
j¼1 Jijnj,t. With  i 1, we see
that this occurs with probability  (
P
j Jijnj,t #i) where
 ( ) is the cumulative normal distribution. From a
reduced form point of view this is just the intensity of
default of firm i at time step t (in a given economic
environment specified by the set of firms defaulted at
time t). This allows us to re-interpret the (rescaled) initial
wealth and impact variables #i and Jij in terms of the bare
default probabilities (Ku ¨ hn and Neu 2003, Neu and Ku ¨ hn
2004, Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn 2006). In other words, if
company i has an expected default probability of pi in a
given time unit (e.g. one month in the present setup)
as predicted from tables from ratings agencies, then
#i¼  
 1(pi). Similarly, the expected default probability
pijj of firm i, given that only firm j has defaulted leads to
the value Jij¼ 
 1(pijj)  
 1(pi).
In determining the model parameters by the method
suggested above we are splitting our default probability
into terms that come from credit contagion and other
terms such as the bare default probability that come from
historical data. It could fairly be argued that the historical
data already incorporate the credit contagion terms and
thus we are double counting. As we will see later in
numerical simulations, the credit contagion terms make
very little difference to average behaviour and thus making
estimates based on average historical data is still a rea-
sonable approach.
In choosing the variable  i we follow the prescription
given by BASEL II (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2005) which sets
 i ¼ 0:12
1 e 50PDi
1 e 50 þ0:24 1 
1 e 50PDi
1 e 50
  
  0:12ð1þe 50PDiÞ, ð4Þ
where PDi gives the probability of default of firm i
over one year, ignoring credit contagion effects. With
pi¼ ( #i) as the monthly default probability, we have
PDi 12 ( #i). The BASEL II framework does not
directly motivate this definition but the broad effect
of (4) is that the correlation that all firms have with
the economy encoding their systematic risk lies
between 0.12 and 0.24. Further, the less risky firms
are more closely correlated with the state of the
economy—suggesting that the BASEL II viewpoint
is that less risky firms typically tend to be the larger
ones, hence the ones connected to larger parts of the
entire economy.
We still have to specify the form for the economic
interactions. We adopt here a probabilistic approach,
and investigate a ‘synthetic’ portfolio, described by its
statistical properties. Specifically, we take the interactions
to be random quantities of the form
Jij ¼ cij
J0
c
þ
J
ﬃﬃﬃ
c
p xij
  
: ð5Þ
Here, the cij2{0,1} detail the network (presence or
absence) of interactions between different firms and we
choose these to be randomly fixed according to
PðcijÞ¼
c
N
 cij,1þ 1  
c
N
  
 cij,0, i5j, cji ¼ cij: ð6Þ
We assume that the average connectivity c of each firm is
large in the limit of a large economy; this will allow the
influence of partner firms to be described by the central
limit theorem and the law of large numbers. Concerning
the values of the (non-zero) impact parameters, we
parametrize them as shown, with xij assumed to be
zero-mean, unit-variance random variables, with finite
moments, and which are pairwise independent,
xij ¼ 0, x2
ij ¼ 1, xijxji ¼  , xijxkl ¼ 0 otherwise: ð7Þ
The parameters J0 and J determine the mean and variance
of the interaction strengths; the scaling of mean and
variance with c and
ﬃﬃﬃ
c
p
, respectively, in (5) is necessary to
allow a meaningful large c limit to be taken. Taking J040
would encode the fact that, on average, firms have a
synergy with their economic partners.
At first sight, specifying the Jij appears to introduce
a vast number of parameters into our model, but in fact
only the first two moments of the distribution of inter-
action strengths are sufficient to determine the macro-
scopic behaviour of the system, and so the model space
is not too large.
Let us now turn to the capital required to be held
against credit risk. In the BASEL II document (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2005) the capital
requirement for a unit-size loan given to firm i is
Ki ¼LGDi  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 i
p
  1ð0:999Þþ  1ðPDiÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  i
p
  
 PDi
  
Mi:
ð8Þ
The first factor, the loss given default LGDi of firm i,i s
related to the average fraction of a loan that can be
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9recovered despite default. The last factor, Mi, is related to
the maturity (long dated loans are inherently riskier).
Adjustments related to liquidity (low liquidity loans are
risker) and concentration (fewer, larger loans give a
greater variance in returns for given expected return) are
occasionally also included in this factor—concentration
adjustments, in fact, are a means to account for reduced
granularity in a credit portfolio resulting from the pos-
sibility of credit contagion.
The factor inside square brackets in (8) is entirely
related to the loss-frequency distribution. The first term
is the value of the loss frequency not exceeded with
probability q¼0.999 under fluctuating macro-economic
conditions, with  i describing the dependence of the firm’s
loss frequency on the macro-economic factor. The second
term is the average loss frequency. The value of the
confidence level q is in principle arbitrary, but is related to
the target rating of the bank. The risk weighted asset is
then found by further multiplying by terms such as the
exposure at default (i.e. size of the loan). Thus the capital
required for firm i can be viewed as the loss at the 99.9th
percentile level of stress, in excess of the expected loss,
multiplied by a conversion factor. From this structure it
is clear that a key ingredient for the capital adequacy
requirements is a good model of credit risk that works
well into the tail of the loss-frequency distribution.
Returning to our description of default dynamics,
let us first focus on the case of independent firms, with
Jij¼0 8i, j, and consider a single epoch for our model
with fluctuating forces given by (3) at given macro-
economic condition  0. The probability of a default
of firm i with average unconditional monthly default
probability pi occurring during the epoch t!tþ1 in our
model is given by
hni,tþ1 j ni,t ¼ 0i¼ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 i
p
 0 þ   1ðpiÞ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    i
p
  
: ð9Þ
Since the probability of default is increasing with  0,
we can find the probability of default not exceeded at,
for example, the 99.9% confidence level; it is given by
setting  0¼ 
 1(0.999) in the above equation (recall  0
is distributed as a zero-mean, unit-variance Gaussian
random number). As above, the excess capital required is
the loss at the 99.9th percent level minus the expected loss
(multiplied by a risk factor). However, when we consider
the case of an interacting economy with non-zero Jij,w e
find that, in fact,
hni,tþ1 j ni,t ¼ 0i¼ 
J0mt þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 i
p
 0   #i ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    i þ J2mt
p
 !
, ð10Þ
where
mt ¼
1
N
X
j
nj,t ð11Þ
is the fraction of firms within the economy that have
defaulted up to time t; we also expressed the expected
monthly default rate pi in terms of a ‘rescaled initial
wealth’ #i,  
 1(pi)¼ #i.
Thus we find that our formulation is very similar to
that used in BASEL II. However, we directly take account
of the correlations in defaults caused by credit contagion.
This introduces two extra parameters into the model
but it does markedly change the behaviour in the tails of
the loss-frequency distribution, and thereby in the tails
of the loss distribution itself. Correlation between firms
is essentially a dynamic phenomenon—if there is no
dynamics, there is no way for one firm’s performance to
influence the viability of any other firm. Thus rather than
considering firms to be independent over a single epoch
which lasts the entire period of any loan, we split the
overall time (e.g. one year) into smaller units (e.g. one
month) and let the firms evolve over these smaller time
units with the default probability adjusted (since the
default event in 12 monthly epochs is compounded 12
times as opposed to a single epoch). A firm may default
at any point, but will then influence its partner firms
for the remainder of the time horizon. The complexity
of the theory is merely linear in time, thus it is not a
great computational burden to choose this approach.
Following the approach described by Hatchett
and Ku ¨ hn (2006) it is possible to solve the model in a
stochastic manner. Credit contagion within this model
is encoded at each time by a single number, the fraction
of firms that have defaulted thus far, which evolves
according to
mtþ1 ¼ mt þð 1  h ntð#ÞiÞ 
J0mt þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 ð#Þ
p
 0   #
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    ð#ÞþJ2mt
p
 ! *+
#
,
ð12Þ
where hnt(#)i denotes the time-dependent monthly default
rate of firms with #i #, as influenced by interactions
with the economy, and the larger angled brackets with
subscript # denote an average over the bare monthly
probabilities of default for the ensemble of firms, or
equivalently over the distribution p(#) of their rescaled
initial wealth parameters #. A heuristic derivation of this
result can be found in appendix A. For a full justification
of the assumptions used in the derivation, we refer to
Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn (2006).
As the limit N!1has been taken in equation (12) the
system has become deterministic at the global level
and thus while mt is a random variable it now evolves
deterministically. The efficacy of this approximation
has been examined by Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn (2006), who
showed that already for a portfolio of size N 100 within
a large economic system the results were similar to the
infinite system limit. The differences that appeared were
in the tails of the loss distribution. Finite size fluctuations
lead to fatter tails.
In (12) the Basel II recommendation which links
correlations to macro-economic factors with (uncondi-
tional) default probabilities,  i¼ (pi)! (#i), in (4) is
formally taken into account. Note that this correlation
was not implemented by Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn (2006).
Also, note that credit contagion affects the dynamics
of defaults only via two parameters, J0 and J, which
characterize the mean and variance of the impact
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9parameter distribution. Further, the parameter   which
quantifies forward–backward correlation of mutual
impacts according to (7) does not appear in the final
formulation, nor are there any memory effects in the
dynamics, as would normally be expected for systems
of this type. The reason for this simplifying feature is
in the fact that the defaulted state is taken to be absorb-
ing over the risk horizon of one year.
3. Results
We now turn to presenting a few key results of our
analysis. Our results concerning default dynamics and loss
distributions are obtained for an economy in which the
parameters #i determining unconditional monthly default
probabilities pi according to #i¼  
 1(pi) are normally
distributed with mean #0¼2.75 and variance 5 2
# ¼ 0:1s o
that typical monthly bare default probabilities are in the
10
 5–10
 3 range. The couplings to the macro-economic
factor are chosen to depend on the expected default
probabilities according to the Basel II prescription (4).
In figure 1 we show that renormalization (with respect
to credit contagion) makes little difference to the typical
default dynamics observed for  0¼0, i.e. for neutral
macro-economic conditions. The evolution of the frac-
tion of defaulted firms in interacting economies hardly
differs from that of the non-interacting economy with
Jij¼0,(J0,J)¼(0,0). At least, as the differences are of
the order of 1% of the portfolio after a 12 month period,
the differences are smaller than the uncertainty that
would be introduced by using historic default rates to
calibrate any model (along with other uncertainties by the
model choice). If one were concerned by this difference it
would not be unduly taxing (although potentially rather
unedifying) to alter the independent default probability so
that the mean number of defaulted firms at the end of a
year (or any chosen epoch) was independent of {J,J0}.
In marked contrast to this, the tail of loss-frequency
distributions is strongly affected by the presence of
interactions in the system, as shown in figure 2. Note
that figure 2 also gives the loss distribution for a constant
value of ‘i since then the amount of loss is directly
proportional to the number (or, equivalently, proportion)
of defaulted firms. We also note that the tail of the loss-
frequency distribution is more pronounced than in our
previous study (Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn 2006). This is solely
due to the fact that, in the present paper, we followed the
Basel II suggestion that relates the coupling of a company
to macro-economic factors with its default probability via
(4), stipulating that the coupling to the macro-economic
factor decreases with increasing probability of default.
As a consequence, companies with very low unconditional
default probabilities will be driven into default mainly
in rare situations of extreme economic distress where
interaction generated avalanches of risk events are likely
to occur.
Let us now look at the economy-wide losses per node.
Here we will not only evaluate end-of-year results, but
exploit the dynamical information contained in (12) to
also look at the way losses are accrued as a function of
time t.
For a given macro-economic condition  0, the loss per
node at time t is given by
Ltð 0Þ¼
1
N
X
i
ni,t‘i: ð13Þ
We assume that the ‘i are randomly sampled from the
loss distribution for node i, are taken to be independent
of the stochastic evolution, but are possibly correlated
with the bare monthly default probability. In the large
N limit, this gives
Ltð 0Þ¼ lim
N!1
1
N
X
i
ntð#iÞ‘i ¼
Z
d#pð#Þhntð#Þi‘ð#Þ ð14Þ
by the law of large numbers, where ‘ ¼ ‘ð#Þ is the
mean of the loss distribution for a node with default
probability pd(#).
0.001
0.01
0.1
1
10
100
−0.2 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8 1 1.2
p
(
m
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2
)
m12
Figure 2. Probability density function of the fraction of
defaulted companies at t¼12 months, for (J0,J)¼(0,0)
(bottom) and (J0,J)¼(1,1) (top).
  0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
  0   2   4   6   8 10 12
m
t
t
Figure 1. Typical fraction of defaulted companies as a function
of time for (J0,J)¼(0,0), (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1) (bottom to top),
realized for a neutral macro-economic factor  0¼0.
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9The distribution of the economy-wide fraction
of defaulted nodes and thereby the distribution of the
losses per node is driven by the distribution of the macro-
economic factor  0. Noting that the fraction of defaulted
nodes mt¼mt( 0) (and thereby the loss accrued up to
time t) are monotone increasing functions of  0 which is
itself assumed to be N(0,1), one has
Prob½m   mtð 0Þ  ¼  ð 0ðmtÞÞ, ð15Þ
which entails Prob [L Lt( 0)]¼ ( 0(Lt)) for the loss
distribution. The corresponding probability density func-
tions are obtained via a single numerical differentiation.
A typical result for the loss distribution is shown in
figure 3, for which we consider an economy where average
losses are inversely proportional to the unconditional
default probabilities pi¼pd(#i)¼ ( #i),
‘ð#Þ¼
‘0
" þ pdð#Þ
, ð16Þ
with a parameter "40 as a regularizer preventing
divergence as pi!0. In this way, the contribution
to the total losses will be approximately uniform over
the bands of different default probabilities. We make
no claim that this choice is in any way singled out on any
form of a priori grounds and there is relatively large
freedom of modelling choice in (16)—one just requires
a reasonably behaved function of #. Indeed, if we make
the simpler assumption that the loss distributions are
independent of default probabilities, and take ‘ð#Þ 1,
then the distribution of losses per node simply replicates
the distribution of the fraction of defaulted companies
as shown in figure 2 at t¼12 months. For the
results in figure 3 we took ‘0¼1 and the regularizer
"¼0.005.
In figure 3 we also show the loss distribution at half
term, to illustrate how losses build up over the full risk
horizon of 12 months. Economic interactions are seen to
strongly affect the tail of the loss distribution at large
losses, which is due to the possibility of avalanches of
loss events in times of extreme economic stress. Indeed,
a comparison of the loss distribution of the interacting
system at half term and at full term reveals that the
avalanches that create the mass of the loss distribution
at the extreme end have at half term not yet been able
to sweep through the entire economy, while at full term
they have.
If one were to consider a finite portfolio of M bonds
selected from the economy (which is still considered
large), one would have normal Gaussian fluctuations
around the mean (14) with a variance for the losses
per node inversely proportional to the portfolio size
(Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn 2006).
Note that we have been dealing here with ‘synthetic’
parameter distributions for averages of loss distributions,
as well as for the bare monthly failure probabilities. These
could be replaced by realistic ones without affecting the
general setup.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have looked to incorporate the risk due
to credit contagion into the internal ratings based
approach discussed in BASEL II. While the mathematical
subtleties are discussed in full detail elsewhere (Hatchett
and Ku ¨ hn 2006), essentially the large number of neigh-
bours assumed for firms means that the law of large
numbers and central limit theorems apply to the inter-
actions, meaning that our theory requires only two more
parameters than the BASEL II approach. In terms of
risk, one of the striking results is that while the effect
of interactions is relatively weak in typical economic
scenarios, it is pronounced in times of large economic
stress, which leads to a significant fattening of the tails of
the portfolio-loss distribution. This has implications on
the fitting of loss distributions to historical data, where
care must be taken not only to fit the average behaviour
but also to take care with the more extreme events.
  0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
  1
  0   1   2   3   4   5
P
(
L
)
L
 1e-05
 1e-04
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
  1
 10
−20  0  20  40  60  80  100  120  140
P
(
L
)
L
Figure 3. Top panel, probability density function of losses for
the non-interacting system with (J0,J)¼(0,0) at 6 months (full
line) and 12 months (long-dashed line), as well as for the
interacting economy with (J0,J)¼(1,1) at 6 months (short-
dashed line) and 12 months (dotted line). Note the logarithmic
scale. The lower panel reveals (for the 12 months risk horizon)
that the loss distribution of the non-interacting system (full line)
is slightly larger than that of the interacting system (dashes) in
the region of small losses.
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9We have not considered the question of pricing in the
current paper. One interesting facet that immediately
drops out of these results is that in terms of expected
returns, the effect of contagion does not affect the outlook
much (and if variables are renormalized, then arguably
not at all). By examining figure 3 we can see that, in this
scenario, if the pricing regime only requires risk tolerance
up to the 95th percentile or even the 99th percentile, then
the loss distribution will not change things much from the
case where there is no contagion. However, for a bank or
other institution that really does require capital adequacy
at the 99.9th percentile, the pricing of risk will change
markedly due to the increased capital requirements to
insure against these extreme conditions.
The conclusions concerning loss distributions due to
contagion are broadly in line with those of previous
studies (Frey and Backhaus 2003, Egloff et al. 2004, Neu
and Ku ¨ hn 2004, Giesecke and Weber 2006, Hatchett and
Ku ¨ hn 2006, Kraft and Steffensen 2006). Detailed com-
parison is difficult as setups and underlying assumptions
vary significantly between studies. Whereas Egloff et al.
(2004) and to some extent Kraft and Steffensen (2006)
allow credit quality migration, the other studies do not.
Egloff et al. (2004), Neu and Ku ¨ hn (2004) and Hatchett
and Ku ¨ hn (2006) all allow fully heterogeneous economies,
whereas in other studies (Frey and Backhaus 2003,
Giesecke and Weber 2006) there is a large degree of
homogeneity; the small portfolios studied by Kraft and
Steffensen (2006) would hardly allow one to make a
distinction between homogeneity and heterogeneity at all.
Clearly, the very specific properties of the voter model
studied by Giesecke and Weber (2006) including its
extreme version of homogeneity and regularity are
crucially responsible for many of the findings in that
study, including, for example, the anomalous scaling of
the variance of loss distributions with portfolio size,
which is related to the fact that the average fraction of
low-liquidity vertices in the model is conserved under its
dynamics.
Let us briefly mention the issue of model calibration,
which is discussed in much greater detail by Neu and
Ku ¨ hn (2004). We note that our model requires bare
default probabilities and conditional default probabilities
as inputs. Historical data, however, only contain inter-
action-renormalized default probabilities, and thus the
problem arises of how to disentangle the two effects.
Concerning typical behaviour, figure 1 shows that the
effect of interactions is fairly small, and interaction-
renormalized default probabilities can, to a first approx-
imation within this model, be taken as substitutes for the
bare ones. Concerning conditional default probabilities,
these would have to be obtained from refined rating
procedures as described by Neu and Ku ¨ hn (2004).
An important lesson to learn from the many particle
perspective, however, is to realize that there is no need to
obtain conditional default probabilities for individual
pairs of companies, as only the low order statistics of
these is needed to describe the collective macroscopic
dynamics of the system. Thus the calibration task appears
to be much less daunting than expected at first sight. The
effect of interactions manifests itself only in situations
of economic stress, generating fat tails in portfolio-loss
distributions.
The model we have proposed is relatively simple in
two important respects. Firstly, we do not take into
account credit quality migration but have just two states
for our firms, solvent or defaulted. The model could
be extended to allow for more states for each firm,
although the full complexity of non-Markovian dyna-
mics would resurface in an attempt to take credit quality
migration along these lines into account. Secondly, the
firms and their environment are still fairly homoge-
neous—local connectivities being on average c 1, with
Oð
ﬃﬃﬃ
c
p
Þ fluctuations—which in practical situations is
of course an approximation. This approximation has
been made for convenience rather than out of necessity;
the techniques described by Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn (2006)
can be adapted so as to treat situations with more
heterogeneity in local environments. We intend to work
on some of these possible model generalizations in the
future.
One advantage of our simple model is that it is exactly
solvable and the solution itself is not overly involved
theoretically or computationally, and we only need to
introduce two extra parameters to quantify the effect
of economic interactions—compared with the BASEL II
approach, which ignores credit contagion altogether.
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Appendix A: Probabilistic solution of our model
In this appendix we show how the law of large numbers
and the central limit theorem can be applied to yield a
solution to our model. First we note that the complica-
tions arise in the dynamic equations (1) due to interac-
tions between the different firms. The effect of other firms
in the wider economy on firm i is described by the local
field: hi,t(n)¼
P
j6¼iJijnj,t. The variables nj,t are correlated,
indeed, any variables nj,t in the set with Jij6¼0 will
explicitly depend on ni,t0 for t05t. Thus the local field on
firm i at time t will depend on the state of firm i at times
t05t. However, the model is set up so that if firm i is
solvent, ni,t¼0 and firm i does not affect its neighbours
(and hence the correlation described above is not present).
Further, if firm i defaults and ni,t¼1, then the firms
interacting with i will have correlated states due to them
all experiencing i’s default, but it will no longer have any
effect on firm i—the default state is absorbing over the
time horizon we consider. Using the definition (5) the
local field defined above is given by
hit ¼
X
j
Jijnjt ¼
J0
c
X
j
cijnjt þ
J
ﬃﬃﬃ
c
p
X
j
cijxijnjt, ðA1Þ
which is a sum of random quantities (with randomness
both due to the Gaussian fluctuating forces, and due to
the heterogeneity of the environment). The first contribu-
tion is a sum of terms of non-vanishing averages. By the
law of large numbers, this sum converges to the sum of
averages in the large c limit,
h0
it  
J0
c
X
j
cijnjt !
J0
c
X
j
cijhnjti’
J0
c
X
j
cij hnjti
¼ J0
1
N
X
j
hnjti,
in which angled brackets h...i denote an average over the
fluctuating forces, and the overbar ð...Þ an average over
the Jij, i.e. the cij and the xij. An approximation is made by
assuming negligible correlations between the cij and
the hnjti induced by the heterogeneity of the interactions.
The second contribution to (A1) is a sum of random
variables with zero mean, which we have argued are
sufficiently weakly correlated for the central limit theorem
to apply for describing the statistics of their sum. Thus the
sum
 hit  
J
ﬃﬃﬃ
c
p
X
j
cijxijnjt
is a zero-mean Gaussian whose variance follows from
hð hitÞ
2i¼
J2
c
X
jk
cijcikxijxikhnjtnkti
’
J2
c
X
jk
cijcikxijxikhnjtnkti¼J2 1
N
X
j
hnjti:
An approximation based on assuming negligible cor-
relations has been made as for the first contributions.
Thus the local field hit is a Gaussian with mean h0
it and
variance hð hitÞ
2i, both scaling with the average fraction of
defaulted nodes in the economy. By the law of large
numbers this average fraction will be typically realized in
a large economy, i.e. we have
mt ¼
1
N
X
j
njt !
1
N
X
j
hnjti ðA2Þ
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9in the large N limit. The dynamics of the fraction of
defaulted nodes then follows from (1),
mtþ1 ¼
1
N
X
i
nitþ1 ¼mtþ
1
N
X
i
ð1 nitÞ ðhit #i
þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 ð#iÞ
p
 0þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  ð#iÞ
p
 itÞ: ðA3Þ
The sum in (A3) is evaluated as a sum of averages over
a joint nit, hit, and  it distribution by the law of large
numbers. We exploit the fact that nit,  it and hit are
uncorrelated. Noting that the sum hit þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    ð#iÞ
p
 it is
Gaussian with mean J0mt and variance 1  (#i)þJ
2mt,
and taking into account that nit averages depend on
i through #i, hniti¼hnti(#i), we find
mtþ1 ¼ mt þ
1
N
X
i
ð1 hntð#iÞÞ 
J0mt þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 ð#iÞ
p
 0  #i ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1  ð#iÞþJ2mt
p
 !
:
This version can be understood as an average over the #
distribution (i.e. the default probability distribution)
pð#Þ¼
1
N
X
i
 ð#   #iÞ,
which maps onto a distribution of unconditional default
probabilities as discussed above. Denoting that average
by h...i# we finally obtain the following evolution
equation for the macroscopic fraction of defaulted
companies in the economy:
mtþ1 ¼ mt þð 1  h ntið#ÞÞ 
J0mt þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 ð#Þ
p
 0   #
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    ð#ÞþJ2mt
p
 ! *+
#
,
ðA4Þ
which is just the stated result (12). We have thus an
explicit dynamic equation for the macroscopic fraction of
defaulted nodes in the economy. It involves first
propagating #-dependent default probabilities via
hntþ1ið#Þ ¼h ntið#Þ þð 1  h ntið#ÞÞ 
J0mt þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
 ð#Þ
p
 0   #
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1    ð#ÞþJ2mt
p
 !
,
ðA5Þ
which depends only on mt, thereafter performing an
integral over the # distribution to obtain the updated
fraction mtþ1 of defaulted nodes given in (A4). Note that
all the assumptions and approximations used in this
appendix can be fully justified by using path integral
techniques, as shown by Hatchett and Ku ¨ hn (2006).
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